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Book Reviews
RESIGNATION IN PROTEST, EDWARD WEISBAND & THOMAS M. FRANCK,
New York: Grossman/Viking, 1975. Pp. 230. ($11.50).
A. INTRODUCTION
The domestic turmoil that the United States has experienced as a result
of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal has led an increasing number
of observers to argue that the American polity is experiencing the conse-
quences of basic institutional defects, which require urgent attention. Much
of the recent political literature has been devoted to the examination of the
crises of the last decade, an identification of their sources, and the develop-
ment of political and social reforms to correct the apparent deficiencies. Sig-
nificantly, these analyses have had practical effects in two major instances:
having persuaded Congress to adopt war powers legislation to prevent the
recurrence of 'unauthorized' wars, and a campaign reform act to eliminate
the potential for abuses in campaign financing.
Resignation in Protest falls squarely within this class of investigative
political literature with a practical purpose. The authors, Edward Weisband
and Thomas M. Franck, share with several other observers the belief that
America's recent difficulties point to a dangerous expansion of Presidential
power beyond the institutions designed to restrain it and that radical steps
have become necessary to bring the Presidency under control. Their proposal,
however, is somewhat novel. Instead of seeking to remove specific powers
from the executive branch, to create new watchdog institutions, or to bolster
the power of Congress, they propose an internal check on the Presidency,
designed to turn the executive branch from "a network of personal relations
between a President and his staff" to "a part of the public process in which
the central role is assigned to the people."'
As the title of their book suggests, the key to the Weisband and Franck
solution lies in encouraging executive branch officials who oppose administra-
tion policies to act upon their consciences by resigning and to stimulate public
debate by stating openly the sources of their disagreement. Yet, according to
the authors, the prevailing American ethic of "team play" presently exacts so
great a price from a protest resigner that public officials are seldom able or
willing to exercise the "ethical autonomy" necessary to take such action.
Through a survey of the case histories of twentieth century American re-
signers, they have found that protesters invariably suffer intense personal
anxiety in making the decision to leave in protest, and often sacrifice their
I E. Weisband & T. M. Franck, Resignation in Protest (New York: Grbssmai/
Viking, 1975) at 85.
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professional prospects by doing so. Statistically, only 3 per cent of those who
resigned in protest in this century ever regained a position equivalent or
higher to the one they left, while only 11.8 per cent were readmitted to gov-
emnment at all. By contrast, 20 per cent of those who resigned quietly regained
equivalent status and 35.8 per cent rejoined government in some capacity.
Under such circumstances, the authors conclude, it is not surprising that only
8.7 per cent of all U.S. officials who resigned in this century did so in protest,
and that such resignations have become increasingly rare.
Significantly, Weisband and Franck argue that more frequent protest
resignations not only would restrain Presidential power, but would offer
specific advantages to the system, that contrast sharply with the existing
disadvantages to individual officials. By elevating the level of democratic
discourse, enlivening the political process, and stimulating public conscious-
ness, each protest resignation benefits the system, "quite regardless of whether
the protest resigner and his followers actually do succeed in changing a
particular policy, or whether their policy is, indeed, better for the country."2
Moreover, the authors note that each resignation has the potential to expose
unconscionable governmental policies, draw public attention to hidden or
insufficiently debated issues, supply the public with essential 'inside' in-
formation, and obtain reversal of objectionable policies through legitimate
political action. While some protest resignations achieve these results to a
greater extent than others, Weisband and Franck believe that the potential
alone makes any protest resignation a significant moral achievement, placing
the dissenting official in an ethical position well above those who resign quietly
or who simply 'go along'. In their view, only officials who stay on to subvert
objectionable policies represent a viable alternative to a protest resignation
when important issues are at stake.
The authors support their overall thesis by contrasting the American
experience with British practice, where, they argue, protest resignations are
encouraged even at the risk of jeopardizing governmental policy or revealing
classified information. In Britain, 53.8 per cent of all twentieth century resign-
ers went public. Significantly, 45.2 per cent of these subsequently returned to
equivalent or higher positions, while only 41.7 per cent of the officials who
resigned quietly did so. Weisband and Franck attribute Britain's advantage
to the character of its Cabinet, which encourages "ethical autonomy" through
the de-centralization of responsibilities, and ensures that executive officials
have an independent political base in Parliament from which to operate if
they decide to resign. As a result, the British system makes resignation a
more palatable alternative for public officials, and encourages them to air
their grievances in their dual roles as government ministers and parliamentary
members.
The specific reforms presented in Resignation in Protest take their cue
from these observations on British practice. Weisband and Franck propose
a constitutional amendment requiring all Cabinet posts to be filled by Members
of Congress (excluding committee chairmen) who would retain their con-
21d. at 22.
Soo [VOL. 14, No. 2
Book Reviews
gressional seats while serving in the administration. This measure, they argue,
would bring into the Cabinet officials with diverse political backgrounds (in
place of the largely corporate-oriented, upper-class 'yeasayers' who now
serve), and would ensure that these officials have both an interest in resigning
when they oppose administration policy and a platform from which to pub-
licize their disagreement. Finally, to foster the acceptance of "ethical autono-
my" among the American citizenry, the authors also recommend a reorienta-
tion of the education system to emphasize "the degree of genuine autonomy
with which decisions are made and whether they are made with reference
to generalized principles of right conduct which are genuinely those of the
individual, Le., which he has freely and deliberately chosen and made his
Own."
3
B. "ETHICAL AUTONOMY" AND THE RESIGNATION
EXPERIENCE
The case that Resignation in Protest presents for resignation depends
heavily upon the view that the political process benefits from "ethical autono-
my" regardless of the specific issues involved. In the authors' study of the
case histories of protest resigners, this preference for "autonomous values"
over opinions of any specific content leads them to praise both 'liberal' and
'conservative' protest resigners, those whose judgment proved correct, and
those who were short-sighted. Quality of vision and personal motives appear
irrelevant to their analysis. At the same time, the authors deny that "ethical
autonomy" implies that an "individual's ethical standards in any particular
instance are 'better' or 'higher' than those of society or his team." 4 Yet, overall,
they seem to regard conduct based on that principle as more likely to represent
conscious deliberation and mature judgment than that based on the ethic of
"team play." Consequently, Resignation in Protest repeatedly offers stern
judgments on the motives of those who resign quietly and those who stay on.
Some of these are described simply as psychologically weak, while others are
said to be motivated by "concern about the loss of a painstakingly built and
carefully projected image of eligibility for high office." 5 Moreover, the authors'
statistical survey implies that those who resign quietly avoid protest chiefly
out of a selfish concern for their professional standing.
Ethical autonomy thus lays claim to certain moral authority because the
officials acting on "autonomous values" are capable of transcending selfish
and self-satisfying motives, such as a desire for psychological peace or occu-
pational security. It apparently frees an official to consider problems in terms
of broad, consistent principles which he has chosen self-consciously. But,
importantly, individual action in the face of group pressures - the trademark
of a protest resignation - is no guarantee that an official has decided an issue
on the basis of objective principles or mature reflection. Indeed, the authors
too easily discount the disruptive influence that overweening ambition or an
inability to accede to superiors can have upon the reasoning of an official in
a Id. at 188.
4 Id. at 4. (emphasis added)
5Id. at 58.
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such situations. For example, they praise Harold Ickes for his "courage" in
relinquishing his post in Truman's Cabinet on moral grounds, and conclude
that, because he was too old at the time of his resignation to run for President,
there was "not the slightest chance of Ickes' motives being self-interested." 6
But they dismiss without sufficient explanation President Truman's account
of the matter: that Ickes "got to thinking he was more important than he was,"
that he was notorious for "resigning" from the Roosevelt Cabinet whenever
he failed to get his way, and that, despite his age, "he wanted to be President
in the worst way."'7 While Truman's view of the matter may have been self-
serving, at the very least it raises doubts about the status of Ickes' protest
resignation as an example of disinterestedness and detachment in perspective
or careful deliberation in action.
Notably, in cases of this sort, protest may actually be a sign of psy-
chological weakness rather than strength of character. Whether he resigns in
protest or quietly, every departing official has some stake in personal vindica-
tion. Protest resigners are often those who exhibit a certain self-importance
but who ultimately lack sufficient confidence in their own views. They thus
require the approval of public opinion to support the moral universe implied
in their resignations. Such tendencies raise doubts about the relative impor-
tance of the specific policies at issue and the desire for public pre-eminence
among the motives for a protester's actions. It is no accident that the ranks
of protest resignations are filled with the names of Presidential aspirants.
These characteristics, in turn, make for a certain rigidity within the
understanding of the protester. Men commonly defend their most superficial
opinions with the greatest vehemence and abandon views that derive their
support from numbers only with severe public embarrassment. By contrast,
a quiet resigner is often one who is genuinely open-minded, willing to recog-
nize the other point of view even if he cannot agree with it, and interested in
the opportunity for continued reflection once he has left his post. These
attributes can be of great importance whenever taking an alternative opinion
seriously requires some deference to its author and his position. Thus, Dean
Acheson, whose 1933 departure from the Roosevelt administration over
national economic policy the authors cite as a model of the "ritualistic" quiet
resignation, recognized that his was not the only possible viewpoint, and that
his disagreement was with the President of the United States, the man the
American people elected to exercise his discretion over such matters. Although
personally unwilling to implement Roosevelt's policies, Acheson did not be-
lieve he had the right to cripple them by subjecting them to a sensational
public debate. Instead, his resignation made clear to Roosevelt the sharpness
of his disagreement, while leaving the President to answer for his policies
before Congress and at the ballot box.
Conduct of this sort represents the very moral and intellectual sophistica-
tion, mirroring the complexity of events, that Weisband and Franck seem to
favor in their praise of ethical autonomy. Given the importance of broad-
Old. at 21.
7 Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Hrry S. Truman (New York:
Berkeley Publishing Corp., 1970) at 226-27.
[VOL. 14, NO. 2
Book Reviews
minded officials in making policy for a country of America's size and wealth,
the frequent appearance of such qualities in quiet resigners may explain some
of their success in regaining government positions. Yet, ultimately, the virtues
of a few quiet resigners do not prove silence superior to protest in every case,
any more than a claim to ethical autonomy can elevate the latter over the
former. Rather, it demonstrates that resignations cannot be evaluated on the
basis of moral abstractions, but must be viewed in terms of the particular
situation, the official's motives, and the quality of his judgment and opinions.
In short, protest resigners are too often simply self-interested, and quiet re-
signers too often self-conscious and public-spirited for the authors to justify
a simple preference for one over the other.
The so-called Saturday Night Massacre during America's Watergate
crisis offers a further insight into the resignation problem. Weisband and
Franck praise Elliot Richardson and William Ruckelshaus for their "rare,
quite solid achievement" in resigning at this critical moment in the scandal
in part because "[t]hey had asserted their ethical autonomy on a question of
principle."8 The situation was actually far more complex. Richardson's stand,
for example, occurred not on broad ethical and constitutional issues, as the
authors suggest, but on narrow personal grounds, viz. his promise to the
Senate Judiciary Committee not to fire Cox without cause. Furthermore,
during the week prior to the firing, Richardson participated in the vain attempt
to gain Cox's acceptance of various compromises on the White House tapes
which would have greatly limited the special prosecutor's power to seek further
evidentiary material. Consequently, the depth of Richardson's disagreement
with the President on the substantive issue of curtailing the Watergate prosecu-
tions is open to question. But, most importantly, these resignations cannot be
evaluated seriously without considering the role of Richardson and Ruckle-
shaus in forcing President Nixon to yield the White House tapes, causing the
appointment of a new special prosecutor, and providing the initial impetus
for the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment investigation. Weisband
and Franck seem to regard these events and the subsequent resignation of
President Nixon as good for the country, an assumption which lends great
force to the example. At the very least, however, it seems fair to say that
the authors would be unwilling to praise Richardson and Ruckleshaus so
unequivocally if they viewed the denouement of Watergate as a great national
disaster. Ultimately, they cannot separate ethical autonomy from the results
that it had. That is, ethical autonomy here does not represent a victory for
the individuals and the system, independent of the issues involved. Rather,
the resignations represent a praiseworthy moral achievement only if one be-
lieves that the particular consequences were good for the country as a whole.
To put it somewhat differently, that a decision has been made upon broad
principles chosen independently and self-consciously is an insufficient guar-
antee that it will not result in national disaster.
The example of the Saturday Night Massacre also demonstrates the
inadequacy of focussing solely on the difficult moral dilemmas faced by protest
resigners. In discussing the episode, the authors' preoccupation with protesters
8 Supra, note 1 at 17.
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and ethical autonomy seems to blind them to the achievement of another
official who chose not to resign in the midst of the crisis. Solicitor General
Robert Bork, who eventually fired Cox, is frequently regarded as the villain
of the affair. Yet Bork, too, opposed the firing of Cox, and considered re-
signing in the face of the White House's order. But as he later explained his
actual conduct to a congressional subcommittee:
When the order to discharge Mr. Cox came to me, I reflected that, and I had very
little time for reflection, I reflected that if I refused and resigned, the Department
of Justice, I think, would have been in chaos and would have been crippled. I think
there would have been, after that pattern had been set by a man who had no
special commitments to the Senate. I doubt that any of the presidential appointees
or senior officers would have stayed. It would have been easy to resign at that
point, personally. Mr. Richardson and Mr. Ruckelshaus both said that if I dis-
charged Mr. Cox, they thought that I should stay on to give the Department some
continuity. It was clear that the decision at the White House to discharge him was
final. If I did not do it, the only result would be to badly cripple, badly hurt the
Department of Justice. I did it for that reasonP
In short, Bork placed the future of the Justice Department and the integrity
of the governmental process above the gratification of personal preferences.
Painful and unpopular, his decision required, in the authors' own terms, at
least as much courage as the courses chosen by the two 'heroes' of the affair.
Moreover, since it was Bork who kept the Watergate Special Prosecution
Force running at this juncture, and who appointed Leon Jaworski to serve as
special prosecutor under workable guidelines, his loyalty to the team proved
to be not a mere "social grace", as the authors suggest, but an important part
of the successful prosecution of the Watergate case, and, hence, a vital con-
tribution to the continued functioning of the American democracy. It is also
significant that, in the end, Bork may have suffered a greater personal loss as
a result of his action than either Richardson or Ruckelshaus. For, without his
participation in the Saturday Night Massacre, Bork may well have been the
leading candidate to replace Justice Douglas on the U.S. Supreme Court. His
failure to get the appointment simply demonstrates that difficult moral de-
cisions, whether they result in loyalty to the team or individual action, almost
always involve personal sacrifice.
Considerations of this sort - the tendency of protesters and quiet resign-
ers alike to have self-interested motives, the ability of both to act with moral
and intellectual sophistication, the moral achievement often represented by
the decision not to resign, and the continuing relevance of the political context
in evaluating the decisions of all public officials - raise doubts about the
value of protest resignations sufficient to invalidate any attempt to draw
specific conclusions from a statistical survey. Figures cannot adequately repre-
sent reality when the variety of motives is so great, the relevant factors are
so complex, and the effects are so diverse. Did the quiet resigner simply tire
of Washington or did he leave for high moral reasons? Did the protester lose
his chance to re-enter government because of his resignation or because of a
change of administration or because he became so disillusioned with govern-
9 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, First Session (1973), "Special
Prosecutor and Watergate Grand Jury Legislation" at 256.
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ment that he did not want a new post? The authors' statistics provide no
answers to these and the countless other questions that are necessary for a
clear picture of resignations in America.
A further example illustrates the point. Weisband and Franck define a
protest resigner as one who offers public criticism that is "reasonably loud,
clear, and, above all, attributable,"' 0 during a period from six months before
his resignation to two years after. Notably, looking beyond the twentieth
century, these requirements would place Thomas Jefferson's 1793 resignation
from Washington's Cabinet among those which represent "the buying of a
separate peace at the expense of the entire process of republican govern-
ment."' 1 Yet Jefferson's claim to high morals and a mature intelligence in this
instance is indisputable. Because of a concern over how a more public role
might damage the fledgling government, he did not allow himself to criticize
President Washington and his policies openly. During the summer of 1793,
however, Jefferson had encouraged James Madison to respond publicly in the
Helvidius papers to Alexander Hamilton's Pacificus defence of Washington's
neutrality policy. His efforts with Madison behind the scenes helped to found
America's first opposition political party. Moreover, although he returned to
Monticello for two quiet years as a private citizen after his resignation, Jef-
ferson re-entered politics to head that party in the 1796 election. He subse-
quently led it to success at the ballot box, bringing the eventual defeat of the
policies he opposed. Thus, although Jefferson was a quiet resigner, his achieve-
ment (and the achievement of twentieth century officials like him), cannot be
described as a systemic reward for his silence, as the authors' survey would
have it, and would compare favorably with the actions of any officials in the
protest column.
C. DOES THE SYSTEM BENEFIT?
The case histories in Resignation in Protest fail to demonstrate that
protest resigners are more likely to reflect the moral and intellectual sophistica-
tion that Weisband and Franck favour or that "ethical autonomy" can be
considered apart from the specific issues involved. For these reasons, the
authors' assertion that a protest resignation always benefits the political
process in the long run, outweighing any detrimental effects it may have on
specific policies or the day-to-day workings of government, takes on special
importance. The example of Jefferson raises some doubts about this thesis as
well, but protest resignations do seem to have one advantage which operates
in every instance: more informed discussion of policy in the public realm.
The other benefits that Weisband and Franck cite either depend on the specific
situation or draw their force from the information factor.
The relationship of protest resignations to informed public debate is
somewhat questionable, however. Weisband and Franck point to the recent
rise in the number of government leaks to the media as evidence that much
essential information is not now available to the public. They argue that this
'0 Supra, note 1 at 197.
11 Id. at 12.
1976]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
practice has thrived in part because the systemic bias toward silent resignation
prevents information from becoming public in more legitimate ways. Pre-
sumably, the authors prefer protest resignation to leaks as a source of informa-
tion because the latter are usually incomplete or self-serving, and are oc-
casionally simply false. But would the information provided by a resigning
official necessarily be more reliable? Having extended himself in public, the
official who has resigned is seeking to justify as well as to explain. Not only
may his position warp his understanding, but his desire for vindication may
well lead to a selective or slanted presentation of information. Few people
knew, for example, that Elliot Richardson joined the White House in seeking
to restrain Cox during the weeks prior to the Saturday Night Massacre or that
he encouraged Bork to execute the President's order.
At the same time, Weisband and Franck ignore the ways in which a
protest resignation can actually hinder intelligent debate. A biased official
offering an inflammatory protest against the complicated anti-discrimination
policies pursued by an administration would hardly be raising the level of
democratic discourse. This problem is often compounded by a President's
inability to respond fully in every situation. The most controversial issues are
often extremely sensitive. They may involve national security matters or a
domestic problem where swift and sudden executive action is the only effective
response. Timely Presidential disclosure of the full, factual story might, in
these cases, silence a protesting official, but it might also cripple the original
policy, in effect giving the protester what he seeks. For this reason, a President
is often forced to discredit the defector - as distasteful as that may be -
instead of joining him in reasoned debate. Weisband and Franck regard this
alternative as a vicious, systemic response against the official who has violated
the spirit of "team play", but often such action is a simple manifestation of
the harsh realities that dominate political life. In such cases, the information
originally available to the public becomes less useful as ad hominem arguments
begin to crowd the field.
Most importantly, by treating the public information element of protest
resignations as an unequivocal advantage, the authors seem to argue that all
issues can and should be debated publicly, i.e., that secrecy in the executive
branch is seldom, if ever, justified. Yet, since the founding, the secrecy of
which the executive is capable has generally been recognized as both necessary
to the formulation of Presidential policy, and advantageous to the conduct
of national affairs. In modem times, secrecy may have become more pervasive
and dangerous, but it is no less important, given both America's role as a
world power and the complexity of economic affairs. In the case of policy
formation, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Nixon has noted a "public interest"
in "candid, objective and even blunt or harsh opinions in presidential decision-
making" which require that a President and his advisors "be free to explore
alternatives in this process of shaping policies and making decisions ... in a
way many would be unwilling to express except privately."' 2 In the execution
of policy, the element of surprise can be essential, for example, to prevent
speculators from profitting in anticipation of a dollar devaluation or companies
12418 U.S. 683 (1973) at 708.
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from raising prices prior to the institution of economic controls. To argue,
as Weisband and Franck do, that secrecy has at times led to policy errors, is
not to prove that officials should be encouraged to disclose information of this
sort whenever they genuinely oppose the views of their superiors.
Since the founders of the United States did acknowledge that executive
branch secrecy can have adverse effects, the constitutional framework does
give the Senate some responsibility for overseeing the handling of govern-
mental information. The ineffectiveness of that body in recent years has been
the result of a wide number of factors. Among these has been the decline in
the collective responsibility necessary for the task, in favour of individual
action governed by a low threshold for moral outrage or political ambition.
The excesses of the McCarthy investigations indicate the dangers of this trend
in their most extreme form. Unfortunately, frequent protest resignations may
only exacerbate these tendencies, by providing those acting under base
partisan motives or self-serving moral imperatives with a ready source of
distorted, incomplete information damaging to the executive branch. The
result will be even greater reluctance among Presidents and administration
officials of both parties to entrust sensitive information to the Senate, and an
even greater loss of credibility for an institution already held in low esteem
by an alarming percentage of the population. In short, by advocating their
new means of controlling executive branch secrecy, Weisband and Franck
may actually be helping to undermine the institutional means created by the
founders to do so.
The authors' shortsightedness on this issue reflects a more profound
misunderstanding of the principles of American government generally, which
appears most clearly in their comparison of resignations in Britain and the
United States. The authors dismiss the theoretical differences between the
British and American forms of government in a few sentences; yet these
differences are severe enough to make a comparison virtually meaningless.
In Britain, since no separation of governmental powers exists between the
executive and legislative departments, no adversary relationship exists between
those who make the laws and those who conduct national policy. No govern-
mental department has the institutional 'interest' and the necessary power to
oversee and control executive decision-making. Opposition parties are always
understaffed and usually have only so much power as the majority is willing
to concede. They seldom have access to 'inside' information. They may appeal
to the electorate only at infrequent and indefinite intervals, and usually at
times chosen by the majority party. A dissident Cabinet official serves as a
valuable rallying point for the opposition, precisely because the minority
often has no firm institutional means for offering a substantive challenge to
governmental policies.
These factors combine to make protest resignations a vital part of gov-
ernment as a means for those out of power to obtain important information,
counter majority party dominance of the governmental machinery, and,
ultimately, force an election. Indeed, quiet resignations also become more
useful and accepted under such circumstances. Thus, the authors' survey
shows not only that protesters returned to government more frequently in
Britain than in the U.S., but that a larger percentage of quiet resigners in
1976]
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Britain also regained their former status when compared with their American
counterparts. Resigners simply have a more basic political role' in parlia-
mentary democracy.
Until recently, the genius of the American system was said to consist in
competing institutions that lessen the government's reliance on the action of
individuals and provide some recourse to the minority, short of precipitating
a crisis. In Britain, individual action and crisis politics are more important
precisely because no similar institutions are available. Significantly, the
British dependence upon such expedients has led to some glaring failures in
governmental policy. Thus, during the appeasement era, the courageous
objections of Anthony Eden and a handful of lesser officials merely highlighted
the absence of an effective dissent within the government, despite the existence
of significant anti-appeasement sentiment within the country. Furthermore,
despite its reliance on protest resignations, British practice is not as tolerant
of information disclosures or dissent in general as Weisband and Franck
suggest. For example, when Winston Churchill's resignation over India policy
established him as an important critic of governmental policy generally, the
brilliant statesman was vilified by party insiders and consistently portrayed
to the public as an eccentric and a war-monger. In the Eden resignation,
despite a round condemnation of Chamberlain, the former Foreign Secretary
remained silent about the incident that precipitated his resignation, viz.,
Chamberlain's rebuff of Roosevelt's secret diplomatic initiative. There is, in
fact, considerable evidence to suggest that British practice is more tolerant of
information disclosures because British tradition uniquely trains public officials
to exercise such self-restraint on the most sensitive matters.
D. THE PROBLEMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The value of the constitutional amendment proposed in Resignation in
Protest becomes somewhat doubtful once the benefits of protest resignations
and the differences between party and constitutional government are thus con-
sidered. Yet, even if a case for protest resignations remains, the practical
difficulties in the Weisband and Franck plan seem insuperable. Is it possible
for one person to manage a sprawling Federal agency and simultaneously to
serve a congressional constituency? The authors answer that, in Britain, single
people do serve in both capacities without excessive difficulty. Yet Britain is
a country which, in territory and population, is only a fraction the size of the
United States. It has no agencies that match the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, or the Department of Defense, and its parliamentary
constituencies are considerably smaller than almost all congressional districts.
Called upon to manage both an agency of 100,000 employees and a con-
gressional district of close to 500,000 inhabitants, an American Cabinet
official would be forced to neglect one or the other, and, perhaps, ultimately
both.
More importantly, here too, differences in the form of government vitiate
the comparison. Members of Parliament serve as representatives to the
national government based upon their identification with a specific party and
specific policies. Their activities centre around the national capital. By con-
trast, American congressmen spend the bulk of their time providing services
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to their constituents. Each congressman stands or falls upon his success in
winning government contracts for local businesses, attracting public works
projects to his district, and helping individuals gain the benefits they deserve
from the Federal bureaucracy. Party identification constantly gives way to
these local interests, which accounts for both the broad range of views found
on both sides of the congressional aisle, and the frequency with which in-
cumbents are challenged in party primaries in their districts. In the case of the
Senate, this emphasis on local interest may be somewhat unfortunate. But
the founders seemed to welcome it in the case of the House as a means of
ensuring Federal concern for those issues closest to the people.
These considerations raise profound questions about a Cabinet official's
ability to make independent judgments on particular issues under the arrange-
ment proposed by Weisband and Franck. Every President would face pressure
to appoint a Secretary of Agriculture, for example, who represents a farming
district or state. Once in the Cabinet, however, that Secretary may be called
upon to restrict grain shipments to the Soviet Union for foreign policy reasons
at a time when grain prices are depressed. His larger responsibility might be
quite clear to him, but he would be equally aware of the next election (which
might come as often as every two years), and the need to explain himself to
his constituents. Moreover, since the Secretary would have little time to
campaign in his district or to provide other services to the voters, he would
be forced to run solely on this issue and other aspects of his record in the
Cabinet. Still further, since the proposed amendment requires that he not be
a congressional committee chairman, he might well have little seniority, and
might come from a marginal or politically-volatile district. Could the Secretary
still follow his independent judgment under such pressures?
In parliamentary democracy, close party identification, party control over
the nomination process, and infrequent elections which focus on a few key
issues insulate an M.P. from many of these pressures. Without adherence to
the separation of powers principle, a U.S. department head would be at their
mercy. To be sure, under the present system, a U.S. Cabinet official does have
a constituency of private interests that he must appease. But this is a concern
primarily for the President, who alone must answer for the Secretary's actions.
And, since the President runs on his record in all policy areas at once, he is
able to manage agricultural policy within a comprehensive context where all
competing interests are considered. Only in such a context can sound national
policy be developed.
Weisband and Franck also ignore the ways in which their proposal
could undermine congressional independence. With a Cabinet of congressmen,
the President would have a powerful tool for manipulating individual members
of congress. Cabinet officials would undoubtedly trade on their status con-
tinually, suggesting that they alone have the full story or are privy to the
President's desires. The resources and the image of authority provided by
their agencies would also greatly enhance their bargaining power, since they
would be able to influence undecided members with the promise of favorable
treatment for their districts. Perhaps most importantly, the President would
be able to manipulate individual members by a promise of a future place in
the Cabinet. Or, he might intimidate a dissident department head by threaten-
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ing to fire him in disgrace, action which, if timed properly, might well cost
him his congressional seat as well as his Cabinet post. In short, by allowing
the President to manipulate some congressmen at will, the proposal would
undermine the independence of that institution which provides many of the
checks and balances now restraining executive branch power.
During the Federal Convention, the founders rejected proposals similar
to that presented in Resignation in Protest for precisely these reasons. They
believed that a congressionally-based executive council, whether simply ad-
visory or actually sharing power, would seriously compromise the doctrine of
the separation of powers, which provided the logic of their plan of government.
Although they have themselves paid insufficient attention to the principle in
the case of executive-legislative relations, Weisband and Franck are willing
to argue that the founders' understanding of the separation of powers con-
tained a fundamental miscalculation. They maintain that, in drafting the
Constitution, the founders seriously underestimated the potential for growth
in the executive branch, and hence the need for an internal check on Presi-
dential power.
The authors' view of the Presidency draws heavily upon Arthur Schlesing-
er's recent book, The Imperial Presidency. Schlesinger argues that since the
founding and especially since World War ff, American Presidents have upset
the balance of powers within the government by using national security issues
and economic crises to encroach on powers originally legislative. As a result,
the original checks and balances of the U.S. system no longer adequately
restrain Presidential power, thus allowing for significant executive abuses,
and the possibility of constitutional crises. As Weisband and Franck put it,
"Vietnam and Watergate: the names are synonymous with insufficiently fet-
tered Presidential discretion."' 3
Although persuasive in some respects, Schlesinger's thesis suffers greatly
from his acceptance of the conventional view that the founders adopted the
separation of powers principle solely as a means of checking governmental
power. In fact, the philosophic origins of the principle, together with the
founding documents, suggest that the separation of powers was also viewed
as a means of compensating for the natural inefficiency of republican govern-
ment. Among the originators of the separation of powers concept, Locke and
Montesquieu in particular were troubled by the indecisiveness and delay in-
herent in direct popular rule, with its sudden passions, partisan divisions,
limited perspective, and shifting priorities. They concluded that modern gov-
ernment could survive only if the republican principle - that every free man
rules himself by participating in the law-making process, either directly or
through representatives - could be made to accommodate the energy and
discretion which only monarchies had previously realized. Framers such as
James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton, and, at times, James
Madison, also recognized this problem, and believed that its resolution was
essential to the success of the government they were creating. As Hamilton
noted in Federalist 70:
13S upra, note 1 at 190.
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There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is
inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-
wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is
destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same
time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. 14
The great size which America was expected to attain added even greater force
to their concern.
The separation of powers principle solved the dilemma by creating a
branch of the government which could act independently and efficiently, but
which would be bounded by institutions that could ensure safety in a re-
publican sense. Thus, the American Presidency inherited a separate con-
stituency, fixed tenure, and a basic unity on the one hand and limited juris-
diction, periodic election, and the risk of impeachment on the other. In short,
in adopting the doctrine, the founders acknowledged the necessity of a unified
executive branch of significant potential, even while providing external checks
against repeated abuses.
Clearly, these attributes of energy and decisiveness have become more
important with the increasing complexities of domestic policy in a country
of 215 million and with America's emergence as the foremost power in the
international arena. Consequently, while unjustifiable Presidential encroach-
ments on congressional powers may explain some of the growth of the execu-
tive branch, far more is attributable to an increasing number of modern
problems that demand the energy only a President can muster. In the end,
history seems to have vindicated the founders' belief that a unified department
of government would be necessary for the success of the Constitution. If they
did miscalculate, it was in failing to discern how many problems would require
Presidential attention in the twentieth century.
In theory, this explanation of the growth of Presidential power differs
only slightly from that suggested by Weisband and Franck, but its practical
implications make any proposal for restraining the executive branch from the
inside far more problematic. An internal check on the President's power
might reduce the potential for abuse, but only at the price of destroying the
energy and efficiency that are essential to the regular performance of his duties.
The number of abuses may decline, but only after America's ability to pursue
its goals has been crippled. The proposal would give each Cabinet official an
independent power base from which to bargain within the executive branch,
thereby restricting the President's ability to make quick decisions in times
of crisis. Through the threat of resignation alone, a Cabinet official might
force a President to abandon any number of options which may be necessary
or useful for the formulation of sound policy. Frequent resignations would
deny the President the power, given him by the founders, to exercise his
discretion, free from the momentary whims of the electorate and independent
of the partisan divisions and narrow interests found in Congress. Significantly,
Cabinet resignations would be most effective, and hence most destructive,
14 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 70, ed., E. M. Earle (New York: The Modem
Library) at 454.
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when, at a time of crisis, a President must institute policies temporarily un-
popular, but ultimately necessary for the safety and well-being of the Republic.
Finally, a look at the recent history of U.S. politics raises the possibility
that, even without the Weisband and Franck proposal, Presidential discretion
has already been reduced to a level below that required for the well-being of
the country. A succession of legislative acts has greatly limited the President's
ability to defend America's international interests and has subjected budgetary
policy to the whims of regionally-based committee chairmen and the pressures
of locally-inspired interests. Whether or not these changes are salutary in the
short run, they do raise questions about America's ability to respond with
energy, consistency, and intelligence to the problems of modem democracy.
Moreover, the legislation of the last decade has so burdened the bureaucracy
with responsibility for programme development, rule-making, regulation and
information-gathering as to make firm Presidential control virtually impossible.
Significantly, the frustrations of managing national policy under such circum-
stances was the primary reason for the unhealthy growth of the White House
staff during the Nixon administration, and was at least partly responsible for
the willingness of Presidential aides to use the questionable or illegal means
of control that contributed to the Watergate crisis.
E. CONCLUSION
One of the epigrams that Weisband and Franck have selected to introduce
their book is a quotation from Alexis de Tocqueville related to the tyranny
of the majority. Although the pages that follow testify to the authors' concern
over this threat to modem democracy, their analysis betrays a deep misunder-
standing of the source of the problem. Tocqueville's reasoning on the tyranny
of the majority ran as follows: In modem democracy, men quite properly
learn to distrust the authority of other men's opinions. Yet this very distrust
of external authority deprives men of any confidence in their own views,
leading them in contradictory fashion to rely on the majority in forming their
most important judgments. The test of a personal opinion becomes the
approval of numbers rather than its internal consistency or scholarly merit.
Developed in this way, moral views easily take on an absolutist quality and
are subject to the storms of passion and outrage that characterize the majority.
According to Tocqueville, public opinion in democracy becomes despotic
when each individual adopts it in this way, believing it to be the result of a
personal decision. In short, the tyranny of the majority occurs not when the
desire for individualism is weak, but rather when it is so great that it over-
whelms the authority of sound opinion and genuine reflection.
As noted earlier, the emphasis of Resignation in Protest is upon "ethical
autonomy" rather than opinions of any particular content. Weisband and
Franck emphasize this aspect in a final chapter, which calls for educational
changes that stress "one's own internalized values" and "autonomous, prin-
cipled judgments of right and wrong."'15 As a call for mature decision-making,
the authors' intentions here are unimpeachable. But, as Tocqueville's observa-
Is Supra, note 1 at 188.
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tions suggest, this focus on individual opinions is not only insufficient but
potentially dangerous. If mass morality is not to dominate in the name of
personal values, Americans must turn their attention not simply to making
opinions "autonomous" and "authentic," but to forming sophisticated judg-
ments that reflect the intricacies of political and social realities. They must
learn not to prefer their own views in every case, but to evaluate their decisions
in concert with others. They must consider their position not only in a personal
light, but in substantive terms that include the importance of the situation, a
comprehensive view of the issues involved, and a concern for the immediate
and long-term impact of their conduct for better and for worse.
Moral decision-making, especially in democracy, requires vigorous atten-
tion to the soundness of opinions, in addition to their origin or style. In the
case of public officials, such decision-making presupposes a firm grasp of the
government's basic characteristics and goals, and an understanding of the
proper role of the individual within the larger whole. Ultimately, this kind of
perspective offers the best available guarantee that government figures will
manage national affairs in the best interest of all American citizens.
The decisive flaw in Resignation in Protest is the authors' failure to in-
vestigate the resignation experience in such substantive terms. Theirs is an
apolitical understanding of complex political events, abstracting from both
the deepest principles of the American founding and the practical workings
of contemporary U.S. government. By relying upon the observations of recent
theoreticians and psychologists, Weisband and Franck have forfeited the
lessons offered by those men most familiar with the complexities of American
political life. First among these are the American founders, whose writings
on U.S. government and politics are of unparalleled insight and sophistication.
By their very failure to consult such sources, Resignation in Protest points the
way to the kind of study necessary before America can resolve her present
dilemma.
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THE REFORM OF PLANNING LAW, NEAL ALLISON ROBERTS, London:
The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1976. Pp. 279. (Cloth: $28.95; Paperback:
$10.95).
Planners and lawyers may not enjoy reading Professor Roberts' new
book, The Reform of Planning Law, but they should read it anyway. The
author tells them that their plans and preoccupations with judicializing the
process are not worth very much, and I think he is right. By exploding the
myth that professionals have a monopoly on good plans and the best processes,
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